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9. A Comparison of International
Upstream Petroleum Regimes
Frank C. Alexander, Jr.
Fraser Milner Casgrain
Calgary, Alberta
1. Introductiont
Association of International Petroleum Negotiators Host Govern-
ment Contract Handbook: The "HGC Handbook" provides an analysis of
selected articles found in host government contracts ("HGCs" - the full
range of contrac:s between a foreign investor international petroleum
company and a host government, inclusive of production sharing agree-
ments, tax royalty contracts ["concessions"] and service contracts). The
purpose of the HSC Handbook is to provide an academic review of se-
lected articles found in HGCs.
2. Conceptual Review of the Relationship
Host Countries invite International Oil Companies to perform petro-
leum operations in the Host Country because the Host Country does not
wish to risk its own capital.
International Oil Companies also have technology often not avail-
able to the host country.
3. Key HosiCoun try Considerations
International Oil Company performance.
not just production, revenue, and reserves - also information
generation for host.country.
Host Country share of revenue, and share of profit.
Host Country overall management of petroleum resources.
Host Country discretion to withhold approval of International Oil
Company assignments to third parties that might be dangerous to
the Host Country.
Host Country discretion to withhold approval of International Oil
Company cross-border pipelines.
Reasonable information disclosure rights (regarding new discover-
ies) .
Training and transfer of technology.
Local content.
HSE - Health, Safety and Environment.
Including International Oil Company environmental indemni-
ties/insurance (or parent guarantees).
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4. Key International Oil Company Considerations
International Oil Company share of revenue (for "pay-out").
International Oil Company share of profit.
Management and control - operations approval mechanisms - abil-
ity to monetize discoveries.
Export.
Right to produce at MER - Maximum Efficient Rate.
Currency exchange and transfer rights.
No mandatory conversion.
Right to maintain accounts in hard currency.
Reasonable assignment and encumbering rights.
Reasonable confidentiality of International Oil Company generated
information.
Gas terms.
Right to hold non-associated gas discoveries past the end of the ex-
ploration period.
Security of investment.
5. HGCs
Definitions and the three general types of HGCs.
"Host Country" (or "HC")
Means a country, a subdivision of a country, or an agent or instru-
mentality of a host government (such as a "national oil company" or
"NOC") which signs an HGC with an International Oil Company.
"IOC"
Means a foreign investor international oil company.
"Upstream Petroleum Regime" (or "UPR")
Means the HGC, the applicable Host Country legislation, and appli-
cable Host Country treaties which, taken together, describe the rela-
tionship between the International Oil Company and the Host Coun-
try.
"HGC"
Means the full range of the contracts between the International Oil
Company and the Host Country, inclusive of production sharing
agreements, royalty/tax contracts ("concessions") and service con-
tracts.
"JOA"
Means an international operating agreement entered into by Interna-
tional Oil Companies - where there are two or more of them signing
an HGC.
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HGC - Host Government Contract
This is the primary international petroleum contract. It is the source
of the money which drives the international petroleum industry.
Parties
Host Country and one or more International Oil Companies. A na-
tional oil company" ("NOC") controlled by the Host Country, or a
domestic private company, might also sign an HGC with an Host
Country.
6. JOA Not Applicble to Relationship Between Contractor and Host
Country
Contractor HGC
(HGC describes reletionsip
between Contractor and Host
Country.]
IOC-< JO IOC
7.. JOA Applicable ro Relationship between Contractor and Host Coun-
try
Contractor HGC .****t
[HGC describes relationsNp
between Contractor and Host
country.]
IOC NOC
8. HGC - Key Distinguishing Factor
Disposition of production.
9. Production Sharing Contact ("PSC")
Divides production between the Host Country and the International
Oil Company.
Used by approximately 60% of Host Countries.
10. Royalty and Tax Agreement ("R/T") (also called "Concession")
Basically provi Jes for the International Oil Company to receive all
production (excepting royalty).
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Used by approximately 40% of Host Countries.
11. Service Contracts
Risk Service Contract - provides for the International Oil Company
to receive none of the production; International Oil Company re-
ceives cash only. International Oil Company share of revenue gen-
erally calculated on same basis as International Oil Company share
of production calculated under PSA. International Oil Company
may, or may not, have the right to buy a certain amount of the pro-
duction.
Pure Service Contract - International Oil Company has no risk. In-
ternational Oil Company renders services to Host Country for a
fixed fee, regardless of results. Again, no production.
Has been used by only a limited number of Host Countries (e.g.
Iran, Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil).
12. HGC Types
Some Host Countries use more than one HGC format (e.g. Kazak-
stan, Pakistan, Russia, Trinidad & Tobago).
13. "Cost Petroleum"
The purpose, under a PSA, is to provide the International Oil Com-
pany with a higher percentage of revenue early in the project - this
accelerates International Oil Company "pay-out".
Use of an R Factor can also achieve a similar result.
A PSA with no "cost petroleum limit" (i.e. previous Indonesia
PSAs) is, essentially, an R/T!
14. Myths about PSAs
That "cost recovery" permits International Oil Company to recover
costs faster under a PSA than under an R/T.
That the "cost petroleum limit" describes a limit regarding the % of
costs that may be recovered - as opposed to timing of the recovery
of costs.
That only PSAs limit the speed at which an International Oil Com-
pany may recover costs - and then only by way of the "cost petro-
leum limit."
That Host Country has greater management and control over Inter-
national Oil Company by way of "joint review committee."
15. HGC Types - How Different Are They?
PSAs,R/Ts, and Risk Service Contracts are very much alike.
"Government Take" (profit split).
Effective Royalty Rate.
Management and control.
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Disposition of production
FiscalTerm fee0o01Exploration***
c ... .I.
M ...... ......
16. Summary Calculation of Prof it Split and Lifting Entitlement for
RoyaltylTax Contract
Assumptions
1. Full cycle, "life of field", cost/revenue ratio of @35%;
2. Royalty @ 10%;
3. Incon e Tax @ 35%; and
4. "Governent Participation" of 10%.
Gross Revenue
IO
.$0 0h0
16. Sumary  uaino rfi pi n n Enttlemnt fhr
$35.00
Royalty
10%
s90.00
Full Cycle Costs (CAPEX and OPEX)
$55.00 (Taxable Income)
Pederal Income Tax
@35%
$35,75
Government Participation
$32.18
Division of Profits
Profit Split (OGovernment Take")
Lifting Entitle mont
S32.18
50%
0%
$10.00
s1e25
$3.58
$32.82
50%
10%
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17. Summary Calculation of Profit Split and Lifting Entitlement for
PSA
Assumptions:
1. Full cycle, "life of field", cost/revenue ratio of @35%;
2. Income Tax @ 35%;
3. Profit Petroleum Split 49%/5 1%;
4. "Government Participation" of 10%.
Gross Revenue$100.00
Contractor Share Govermment Share
Cost Recovery (ful cycle CAPEX and OPEX)
$35.00 35%
$65.00 Total Profit 011
Profit Oil Split
@499W$*1%$31.85 S33.15
Income Tax
($11.15) @39 $11.15
$20.70
Government Participation
(S2.07) @LQ.4 $2.07
Division of Profit
$18.63 $46.37
37% Profit Split ("Govenment Take") 71%
65% Liftint Entitlement 35%
18. Summary Calculation of Profit Split and Lifting Entitlement for
PSA
Assumptions:
1. Full cycle, "life of field", cost/revenue ratio of @35%;
2. Income Tax @ 35%;
3. Profit Petroleum Split 49%/5 1%;
4. "Government Participation" of 10%.
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Gross Revenue
$100.00
IC9.hare
9.aunli S.hlare
Royalty
@10% $10.00
$90.00
Federal Income Tax
($0.00)
@35% $0.00
$90.00
Government Participation
($9.00) $9.00
$81.00 Division of Gross Revenue 19.00
Effective Royalty Rate 19%
(in 'worst case" accounting period for host government)
81% Company Access to Gross Revenue
(in order for IOC to recover costs In "best case" accounting period for IOC - Indicative of how fast IOC can
recoup risk capital - I.e. achieve "pay-our)
19. Summary Calculation of Effective Royalty Rate Under PSA
Assumptions (worst case accounting period for host country):
1. Full cycle, "life of field", cost/revenue ratio of @35%;
2. Income Tax @ 35%, but tax deductions offsetting all reve-
nue;
3. Cost Petroleum Limit @ 50%;
4. Profit Petroleum Split 49%/51%;
5. "Government Participation" of 10%.
Gross Revenue
$100.00
Con.actor Share Government Share
Cost Recovery Petroleum
$50.00 @50%
$50.00 (Total Profit 011)
Profit Oil Split
@49%/51%
$25.00 $25.00
income Tax
($0.00) 035% (but with offsettIna deductions) $0.00
$25.00
Government Participation
($2.50) J10Q $2.50
$22.50
Division of Gross Revenue
$72.50 $27.60
Effective Royalty Rate 28%
(in 'worst case" accountng period for host country)
72% Company Access to Gross Revenue
(in order for IOC to recover costs in "best case" accounting period for
IOC - Indiceaive of how fast the IOC can recoup Its risk capital - I.e. achieve "pay-our)
20. Fiscal Elemenis and Mechanisms
Royalty.
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"Cost petroleum" (under PSAs).
Amortization rates for CAPEX.
"Profit petroleum" (under PSAs).
Profit taxes.
Tax rate.
Tax base (amortization rates for CAPEX).
"Government participation".
"Ring-fencing" (for both cost rec. and taxes).
21. Fiscal Elements - world averages
Royalty - 7%.
Profit taxes.
Tax rate - 35%.
Tax base (amortization rate of CAPEX - 20%).
"Cost petroleum limit" - 65%.
No amortization for cost recovery (PSAs) - 50%.
"Government participation" - 49%.
Approx. one half require NOC reimb. of exploration costs.
"Ring-fencing" (cost recovery and/or taxes) - 55%.
"Government Take" - 65%.
"Effective Royalty Rate" - 17%.
Above from Daniel Johnston & Co. (2001)
22. Fiscal Elements and Mechanisms
Flexible v. inflexible.
Sliding scales based upon production.
Sliding scales based upon price.
Sliding scales based upon profitability.
R Factors (e.g. Venezuela, Qatar, Azerbaijan).
Additional Profits Tax (e.g. Kaz and PNG.)
Letting the marketplace determine.
Trinidad & Tobago.
23. PSAs - Better Than the Other HGCs?
More complicated.
Reserve booking problem.
Politics.
24. Legislation v. HGC
How much of the relationship should be described in the legislation,
and how much in the HGC?
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Some Host Countries (e.g. Bahrain) do not have a petroleum law at
all.
How much of the relationship should be negotiable? How does this
work in the context of a bid round?
25. Licenses
Are they necessary?
Does every country use them?
Bahrain, Brunei, Qatar and Trinidad & Tobago have not
What are the potential problems where there is both an HGC and a
license?
26. Area, Term, and Relinquishments
Contract Ar-a.
Contract term for exploration (if applicable) and develop-
ment/production.
Relinquishnients.
Interna:ional Oil Company right to retain a non-associated gas
discovcry past the end of the exploration period?
27. Internationai Oil Company Work Program Commitments
Seismic.
Drilling.
- What constitutes performance by International Oil Company?
Depth? Geologic horizon?
- Does an appraisal well count toward the International Oil
Company commitment?
- What happens if International Oil Company has to terminate
well before reaching required depth?
28. Financial Security Instruments
Bank guaran :ees.
Parent guarantees.
29. Bid Rounds and Direct Negotiation
Bid elements.
WP and fiscal.
Transparency.
Competition.
When direct negotiations might be attractive alternative to tender-
ing.
- 231 -
Key is how elements are weighted - Host Country can, for example,
emphasize WP over fiscal elements, or even production bonuses
over signature bonuses.
30. IOC Security ofInvestment
Expropriation - how is the amount of applicable damages deter-
mined?
Stabilisation (including fiscal and HSE).
"Freezing".
"Government/NOC pays".
"Economic balancing".
31. IOC Security ofInvestment
Force majeure.
Termination and suspension.
Governing law.
Hardship doctrine problems under civil code jurisdictions.
Waiver of sovereign immunity.
International arbitration outside of Host Country.
ICSID - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes.
32. IOC Security ofInvestment
Bilateral investment treaties.
Energy Charter Treaty.
SOPOXM- OCC~caC
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